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Abstract
Peer-to-peer networks provide better scalability for the
filesharing applications they underlie. Unlike traditional
server-based approach such as FTP, maintaining a constant
QoS with a fixed number of servers seems feasible, what-
ever the number of peers involved. However, a P2P file-
sharing network sometimes happens to saturate, notably in
a semi-P2P filesharing architecture or during flashcrowds
phase, and scalability may fail. Even “smart” networks can
encounter the whole file but one piece downloaded case,
which we call starvation. We suggest a simple and versa-
tile filesharing model. It applies to all pieces-oriented file-
sharing protocols used in softwares such as MlDonkey or
BitTorrent. Simulations of this model show that starvation
may occur even during flashcrowds. We propose a theoreti-
cal explanation for the so-called starvation phenomenum.
1 Introduction
A P2P file-sharing network is an interface permitting
data exchange between users arriving and departing in-
dependently. P2P networks raise a wide-range of sub-
jects to study, including dynamic management of P2P over-
lay networks [10, 12], publication and search of shared
content [6, 2] or analysis of effective download capacity
[4, 11, 9, 7]. The downloading efficiency is crucial, as it is
one of the main characteristics most people would consider
to choose a P2P network rather than another. In this paper
we focus on the “unfinished download” case. This problem
may arise when downloading one’s favorite Linux distrib-
ution using, for efficiency reasons, a file-sharing software
such as MLDonkey [3] or BitTorrent [1].
The underlying protocols divide files into smaller parts
that are often called pieces or chunks. This allows peers to
begin sharing content as soon as they have one piece. Imag-
ine that after a short while, you have obtained the whole file
except one piece and you are waiting for your download to
be completed. This may be long, very long, or could simply
never happen. We call this phenomenum starvation.
Section 2 introduces related work and briefly describes
our approach and our modeling assumptions. Section 3
shows interesting related results obtained by means of simu-
lations of the model. In Section 4 we present stability results
for our framework. This provides some insight into the star-
vation issue in real file-sharing networks. Section 5 com-
pares different upload strategies and gives characteristics of
safe states, where data can survive as long as needed. . .
2 Model
Filesharing has been previously modeled in different
ways. For instance, [4] uses a multiple class closed queuing
network. Herein we study the filesharing of a single file in
an highly connected overlay network, which is often called
swarm. We implicitly assume that a server, which does not
possess the file, coordinates the users. This assumptions
match well BitTorrent protocol, as users must connect to a
so-called tracker to participate. Peers correspond to P users
that want to download the file, and that can potentially share
partial content. Seeds are S users that share the whole file.
We denote by K the number of pieces the file is split into.
These pieces can be downloaded independently.
This simple framework has first been proposed by [11].
[9] extended it to a fluid model, and [7] offered some math-
ematical results about stability of such systems.
The present paper differs from related work on an im-
portant point: we choose an Upload-oriented Approach
(UA) rather than a Download-oriented Approach (DA). This
means in simple terms that for us, using UA, the sender
choses which piece to send to whom whereas in the DA,
the receiver choses which piece to download from whom.
Neither UA nor DA is completely accurate, but providers
usually impose stronger limits on the uplink than on the
downlink, which makes our model more realistic.
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Figure 1. Stable state in a GR strategy
A second reason for this choice is that a sender should be
able to specify which piece should be sent to which receiver,
according to what it thinks is the best for the collectivity (or
for its own mid-term interest). Specifying what is best de-
fines an UA strategy. Conversely, a receiver mainly wishes
to complete its download as quickly as possible: using more
subtle download strategies can only spoil the peer.
Suppose any user able to upload at least one wanted
piece will do so. This appears to be a reasonable approxima-
tion ([1] uses a choking algorithm to stimulate the uploads),
though reality is more complex. As we show in section 4,
this framework leads to an interesting result, called star-
vation, where unrestricted upload can sometimes severely
injure the service capacity of a swarm.
3 Simulations
Our simulations assume a constant number of seeds S:
we place ourselves in a worst case behavior where peers
quit the swarm at the very moment they finish the download.
The scenario of a company with a fixed number of servers
diffusing some files with the help of P2P technology would
achieve this worst case. We also assume P , the number of
peers, to be constant. We are aware that this constitutes a
rough approximation. Indeed, defining the number of peers
through an arrival rate σ could be more accurate and is the
subject of further research. However, our results express
better as a function of P . Our objective is to study how this
sort of swarm behaves in some natural situations.
3.1 Strategies
The state of a swarm at a given moment can be repre-
sented by a boolean matrix T = (tp,k)1≤p≤P
1≤k≤K
where:
tp,k =
{
1 if user p possesses the piece k
0 otherwise
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Figure 2. Starvation in a GR strategy
When an uploader has just finished uploading a given
piece, it has to choose a couple (i : peer, j : piece) and
start uploading piece j to peer i if possible. According to
our UA model, a strategy is a way to choose such a pair
(i, j). First say that a pair (i, j) is admissible for a given
peer if it possesses piece j and peer i does not. There exist
two canonical ways to choose such a pair. Globally Ran-
dom (GR) strategies consist in choosing a pair (peer, piece)
at random, like for instance uniformly from the admissible
pairs. A selective strategy consists in choosing first a peer,
then a piece, or first a piece then a peer. Choices may be
randomized1 or done according to some kind of (positive)
discrimination (rarest piece first, or emptiest peer first).
3.2 Results
For the sake of simplicity, let’s assume everyone has the
same upload bandwidth and upload of one piece is com-
pleted in one time unit. The download/upload bandwidth
ratio r is supposed to be infinite2, implying the number of
pieces a peer can get in a time unit is not bounded. We
choose S = 1, P = 100 and K = 120.
This scenario is motivated by the study of the flashcrowd
phase of a swarm[8, 5], with just one original seed – the
user that first offered the file to be shared – assaulted by
fresh peers. Simulations using the GR strategy starting with
P empty peers tend towards two different stationary states,
a safe state and a starvation state. Both states are roughly
equiprobable with our parameters. In safe state, all pieces
are fairly distributed among the peers, and the original seed
may leave without prejudice to the swarm (the peers are
1Note that uniform GR strategy is not equivalent to bi-uniform selective
strategy for a given set of admissible couples in most cases. For instance, a
most-wanted piece will be included in many admissible pairs and be more
likely to be chosen that a common piece using uniform GR strategy. This
is not the case in bi-uniform piece-then-peer selective strategy.
2Actually, for most people using ADSL, r = 4 or r = 8, but r = 20
is not unusual. Later, we will give results for such ratios.
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Figure 3. Piece distribution in a stable state
self-sufficient). In starvation state, there exists one piece,
peers are starving for, which most of the time nobody but
the original seed possesses. If the seed quits in a starvation
state, the swarm dies. Figure 1 shows the matrix T in a
typical stable state and Figure 2 shows a typical starvation
state (lines represent peers; line 0 stands for the seed).
Selective strategies that rely on random choices almost
always converge towards starvation. If positive discrimina-
tion is used (for choosing the piece, the peer or both), a safe
state is obtained.
We note that all safe states are not identical. Parameters
like average piece density or download speed distribution
can vary, as discussed in Section 5.
4 Starvation characteristics
Starvation is a dangerous state where the swarm criti-
cally depends on the original seed, hence we want to deepen
the whereabouts of this state.
4.1 Occurrence
The hazard of starvation in a flashcrowd is intuitively
easy to understand. All safe states observed imply all the
pieces having roughly the same availability (as shown in
Figure 3). On the other hand, starvation means having a
very rare piece while the others are almost totally spread.
During flashcrowd, we note a geometric progression of
availability of the pieces uploaded by the seed(s) (see [11]
for a good description of this phenomenum). This leads
to strong irregularities of the pieces distribution in the ear-
lier times. If those irregularities are not correctly smoothed
by the upload strategy, the swarm starvation can occur dur-
ing the earlier cycles. Therefore random selective strategies
usually lead to starvation, whereas positive discriminating
strategies always lead to safe states: former strategies do
nothing to smooth out the pieces distribution while the latter
ones care about equity. Subsequently, we can then wonder
why a safe state can be reached using GR strategy. Intu-
itively, the answer is that GR strategy performs partial pos-
itive discrimination, as the probability for a piece k to be
downloaded is basically proportional to the number of peers
requesting it, and the probability for a peer p to receive a
piece is roughly proportional to the number of pieces it re-
quests.
4.2 Robustness
During starvation, we call waiting peers those having all
pieces but the missing one. Because of the contaminating
power of waiting peers (assuming peers that are able to
upload do so, newcomers get the common pieces fast due
to the waiting peers upload capacity, and then wait them-
selves), starvation can be robust even using the smartest
strategy. For example, with a number of seeds S = 1 and an
infinite download/upload ratio r, a starvation will be stable
as long as the number of peers P is greater than or equal to
the number of pieces K . The time to feed a waiting peer
(that is one time unit if S = 1) is then greater than or equal
to the time to contaminate a newcomer. This result spreads
for all r and S, and a sufficient (but not necessary) condition
for starvation stability, independent from the strategy, is:
P ≥ S + S(K − 1)(1 +
1
r
) (1)
Proof A starvation is necessary stable when the contam-
inating power of waiting peers is greater than the healing
power of seeds. The number of newcomers waiting peers
can contaminate in a time unit is P
′
K−1 , where P
′ is the num-
ber of waiting peers. Seeds can heal at most S patients per
time unit. We also note that due to bandwidth ratio, new-
comers needs K−1
r
+ 1 time units to be contaminated.
The healing bound implies we have (in a starvation state)
P − P ′ ≤ S(K−1
r
+ 1), that is P ′ ≥ P − S(K−1
r
+ 1). As
long as P
′
K−1 ≥ S, that is P
′ ≥ S(K − 1), the starvation is
stable (note that P ′ can vary at each time unit). So starva-
tion will be stable whenever S(K−1) ≤ P −S(K−1
r
+1).
This leads to Equation (1)3.
Given the assumption that anyone able to upload a piece
to somebody will do so, starving peers will always perform
good strategies to contaminate other peers. On the other
hand, the healing strategy of seeds must be highly precise
to be efficient (each seed must heal a patient with each time
unit). Thus we can say that (1) is a precise stability bound
for strategies using positive discrimination first (whether
with respect to peers or pieces), while starvation stability
in random oriented strategies is much more important.
3Observe that if r = +∞, Equation (1) becomes P ≥ SK .
4.3 Remarks on starvation in real networks
Although our model is upload-oriented, it captures a phe-
nomenum that occurs in real peer-to-peer sharing networks.
For now, we can only give intuitive reasons for that. In
eMule networks, users trying to get a file are waiting in
a queue, and once their turn comes, they are granted one
(or more) pieces. This queuing system is a priori indepen-
dent of the number of pieces users possess (although there
may be a slightly negative discrimination due to the fact that
“old” peers are more likely to have at the same time many
pieces and good positions in queues). Thus we would say
eMule transfers can be seen as a selective random strategy4.
The sensitivity of this strategy to starvation phenomena pro-
vides a possible interpretation of starvation in the case of
eMule.
For BitTorrent networks, we could imagine two reasons
for starvation occurrence. This might happen during the
flashcrowd phase if there are many peers replicating almost
immediately every piece as soon as they get it, but are set
to quit the swarm at the time their download finishes (some
clients can be triggered to do that). We think starvation can
also happen when P tends toward 0 (the flashcrowd is fol-
lowed by a steady, then a decreasing phase [5, 8]). If after
the decreasing phase, a piece disappears and starving peers
begin to accumulate, this may create a mechanical regrowth
of the swarm in a starving state.
Equation 1 shows that once a starvation occurs, healing
can be fastidious or even impossible. A frequent strategy
for the original seed of a swarm when piece availability is
compromised is to re-seed, that is to reintegrate the swarm
the time for new seeds to appear, then to leave. The problem
is that real starving peers may be as eager to quit as those
of our model, and may leave shortly after their download is
complete, perpetuating the starvation.
Note that some BitTorrent clients have an interesting
seeding mode, called Superseed, where the seed lies and be-
haves as a peer. This prevents the seed from being polluted
by requests of widely spread pieces and allows to focus on
the rarest pieces. This ensures a real positive discrimination
strategy.
Last piece importance
One may wonder whether the existence of a piece missing is
an issue. With Error-Correcting Codes (ECC), it is possible
to share files that can be completed without all the pieces.
But ECC alone can not solve the problem for long: know-
ing a missing piece is acceptable, peers will start to behave
consequently. So ECC allows a swarm to function in star-
vation. Consider a virtual swarm with K − 1 pieces, what
4In fact, some clients implements some discriminating strategies, but a
significant part does not.
happens then if this virtual swarm goes into starvation ? If
the issue of a missing piece is not managed, ECC will only
delay the problem. As a matter of fact, the missing piece
may be a real issue in P2P networks as they become more
important, and a real optimization of the transfers strategies
can be beneficial.
5 Efficiency of upload strategies
We now want to compare the different strategies seen in
Section 3.1, considering QoS indicators other than stability,
such as average download speed, original diffusion, density,
and robustness to very greedy peers.
5.1 Linear strategy
For the record, we note that earlier KaZaA protocols
used to share a file linearly (from the first to the last piece).
If this may be advantageous for live streaming purposes, it
is not a good idea from a starvation point of view, because
the last piece will always be only possessed by seeds. Even
if peers do not often quit as soon as they get their last piece,
the last pieces of the file are very likely to miss sooner or
later, unless maintaining some reliable seeds forever. This
major drawback explains why linear strategy is no longer
used in modern P2P protocols.
5.2 Average download speed
The global download speed is bounded by the sum of
upload bandwidths. For a (S, P ) swarm with uniform up-
load bandwidth U , the average download speed cannot be
greater than D¯max = S+PP U . Simulations show that when-
ever a safe state is reached, average download speed tends
towards this limit.
If the swarm starves, average download speed can be re-
duced: it is a good approximation to say that only seeds can
trigger the end of a download. Thus, if there is one seed and
if the theoretical minimum average time between 2 finished
downloads is less than a time unit, peers are going to stay
idle (without uploading) part of the time. More precisely,
with S seeds, the average download speed during starvation
is bounded by min(S.K
P
D¯max, D¯max).
5.3 Diffusion during flashcrowds
Flashcrowd is a sensitive phase of a swarm’s life. If the
original seed leaves before it ends, the game is over. More-
over, the original seed often wants to minimize its upload
time. For both reasons, deployment must be fast. The min-
imum time for deployment is the time for the original seed
to upload each piece a time, that is K time units. This is
achieved if a positive discrimination on pieces is used. On
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Figure 4. Peer-oriented strategy: average
download speed in the download progress
the other hand, if pieces are chosen at random, the mean
time to choose each piece at least once is equivalent to
k ln(k): the burden is ln(k) times greater for the peer com-
pared to positive discrimination strategies.
5.4 Pieces availability
In BitTorrent, the number of distributed copies seen and
the average download are often considered as good indica-
tors of a swarm’s wealth. As said in 3.2, in a safe state, each
piece has roughly the same availability. Therefore, the num-
ber of distributed copies is not far from optimal (see Figure
3). We have also observed that peer-oriented discriminant
strategies seem to have higher piece availability for a given
P + S. However, as pointed out in next paragraph, having
the biggest availability is not always a good thing.
5.5 Robustness to very greedy peers
Very greedy peers (VGP) are peers wanting to get their
file as soon as possible and that are likely to trick the swarm
to do so.
5.5.1 VGP and positive discrimination
Positive peer discrimination helps new users to get pieces
faster. It increases the probability that the uploaded pieces
get replicated several times, as a peer with few pieces will
stay longer. By construction, this leads to stable states
where the distribution of pieces has a small standard devia-
tion (if poorer peer is first selected, it is close to 0). Inten-
sity of download is maximal for newcomers, because they
are preferred. The problem is that the peers wait a very long
time at the end to get their last piece, even when it is not a
rare piece (see figure 4 for download speed versus down-
load progress). Thus, it is profitable to cheat by announcing
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Figure 5. Average download speed in the
download progress : GR stable case
that you have to download a number of pieces larger than
your real one. With K = 60 and P = 120 (parameters of
figure 4), declaring 2 missing files instead of 1 increases the
average download speed by 86, thus increasing the average
effective download speed of the last piece by 43 (there is
one chance out of two to get a piece you already have).
5.5.2 VGP robust strategies
Let f(k) be the average speed download of peers possessing
k pieces. A strategy is said to be robust regarding VGP if
asking for pieces you already have does not increase your
effective download speed.
A random-piece strategy is VGP-robust if f has the fol-
lowing property:
f(k)
K − k
increases (2)
Proof A peer possessing k1 pieces and declaring k2 < k1
pieces will have a average download speed of f(k2) with a
proportion K−k1
K−k2
of useful pieces if the piece strategy is ran-
dom. Thus lying is not profitable if f(k1) > K−k1K−k2 f(k2).
This is the case if the function k → f(k)
K−k
increases.
We observe that this result holds in the case of a
discriminant-piece strategy and in a safe state, because all
the pieces have roughly the same density. In a starving state
with seeds, this result is false: lying allow VGPs to abuse
the discriminant strategy and get the missing piece faster
than it should, with heavy cost for the swarm (one of the
few who possesses the missing piece leaves sooner than ex-
pected).
We verify easily that positive peer-discrimination does
not fulfill (2) for k = K − 1. On the other hand, in GR
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Figure 6. Distribution of download pro-
gresses among users in stable GR strategy
strategy, the download speed (in a safe state) is basically
an affine function of k (see figure 5) that fulfill (2). This
linearity can be intuitively explained if we arbitrary change
the number of pieces k a given peer p0 possesses (all other
parameters being unchanged). The average speed download
for p0 will obviously be proportional to the K − k missing
pieces. Non-linearities noted in Figure 5 come from random
fluctuations and retroactions that have been neglected.
The conclusion of the study of VGP is that positive peer-
oriented strategies are not robust to lies, and that it is bet-
ter to sacrifice some over-availability and homogeneity (see
Figure 6 for a typical download distribution in GR strategy)
to gain robustness, especially when that does not harm the
global download speed, as we have seen.
6 Future work
Following [9], we think it is possible to study the GR
strategy stability and the probability of starving during
flashcrowds using a fluid model. This should give a base
to recommend new upload strategies. We would also like
to improve our model using heterogeneous upload band-
width and departing and arriving of peers ([8, 5] give pre-
cious information about real distributions). This will en-
hance the accuracy of our model and will help to confirm
some hypothesis such as the occurrence of starvation during
the decline of the swarm and the utility of smart reseeding
strategies such as superseeding. Lastly, we consider ana-
lyzing logs from eDonkey servers and BitTorrent trackers
to validate our model.
7 Conclusion
The paper presented an intuitive survey of starvation is-
sues. We showed that a piece-oriented discriminant strategy
is more efficient than a random strategy, so in a certain way
we could say BitTorrent behaves better than eDonkey from
this point of view. We have also shown that peer-oriented
discrimination is less important and can even induce bad
social behavior. These results could be used to enhance or
validate existing protocols. For instance, a tracker aware of
starvation issue could anticipate it and reseeding could be
more effective.
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